CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 574th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference will continue today the consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise a matter pertaining to the work of the Conference may do so. As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to submit for decision by the Conference today the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027, and the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1028, in the order in which those reports were introduced by the respective chairmen.

I have on the list of speakers for today the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representatives of Argentina, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pakistan, Mexico and the United States of America.

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Group, which has been circulated as document CD/1032.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report on the Ad hoc Group's recent meeting, held from 30 July to 9 August, and to introduce the progress report which is in front of you in document CD/1032. Experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended the session.

Last week I had the privilege of attending a meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban together with Mr. Frode Ringdahl, Scientific Secretary of the Ad hoc Group, and Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, Co-ordinator of the ongoing large-scale technical test. We greatly appreciated this opportunity to review in some detail our present activities and to have an interesting exchange of views on verification issues and on the work of the GSE. I hope that, in its deliberations on test ban issues, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will benefit from results already presented by the Group and from results which are to be obtained through our ongoing large-scale technical test. I am sure that the Ad hoc Group in turn will benefit from results to be expected from the NTB Committee.

I will be quite brief in my presentation today, one reason being the presentations already made in the NTB Committee. Another reason is that the Group at present is engaged in the technical planning of further stages of the large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The overall results will be of much more interest, I am sure, to members of the Conference than the technical and detailed arrangements that need to be made for such an extensive global exercise.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

In the overall process of carrying out GSETT-2, the sessions of the Ad hoc Group in Geneva are just the tip of the iceberg. The main part of the work is being done at observatories, laboratories and communications facilities around the world, where hundreds of scientists and technicians are working to make the test possible. Their dedicated work and efforts deserve high appreciation. Our high appreciation also goes to the secretariat for its dedicated support of the Group during its session in Geneva. The Group is at present in the middle of GSETT-2. We are proceeding, as planned, with preparatory experiments to prepare all facilities for the full-scale operational test, tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991. We are gradually improving our performance, people are becoming better trained, communication lines are being established and put to work, and errors in the extensive computer programs used at National and International Data Centres are being discovered and corrected.

Since its meeting in March, the Group has in addition to national and bilateral activities conducted one co-ordinated trial test during the period 19-27 June. Twenty-five countries participated in this test, contributing data from, in all, 53 seismological stations. This is an improved participation as compared to a similar test early this year, when 21 countries and 46 stations participated. The Group also noted with satisfaction that a number of additional countries have expressed their intention to join the experiment and are presently making necessary preparations. Although the participation is gradually increasing, I would like to reiterate that an even broader participation is essential for meeting the overall objective of GSETT-2.

To facilitate such broader participation in the test, the Group decided, at its March meeting, to reduce the technical requirements for participation. While maintaining the prime purpose of GSETT-2, that is routinely to exchange and analyse Level II data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital waveform data, or what we call Level II data, may participate by contributing Level I, or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we today have only few participants, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

While it is important that countries contributing to GSETT-2 participate in the GSE sessions in Geneva, there may be States which find it difficult to provide experts to attend those sessions, but which nevertheless wish to participate in the large-scale technical test. The Co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Basham of Canada, and myself are prepared to work closely with any country which might wish to participate in that way.

In early June 1990 an informal meeting was hosted by the United States at which technical experts, primarily from the four Experimental International Data Centres, participated. The results of this meeting provided a valuable basis for discussions on how to further develop the procedures and computer programs to be used at the Experimental International Data Centres. This work

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

is focused on how to utilize efficiently the waveform data that now is routinely available. This issue still presents a number of technical and scientific challenges.

As you may recall, on 12 April (CD/PV.551), the Conference on Disarmament approved a proposal by the Ad hoc Group that Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should represent the Group at a World Meteorological Organization meeting to discuss the use of its Global Telecommunication System, GTS, during GSETT-2. Mr. Basham attended this meeting in late May and provided the appropriate World Meteorological Organization authorities with the Group's requirements for telecommunication circuits to be tested in GSETT-2. Discussions with WMO made it clear that bilateral or multilateral arrangements are needed among the countries concerned to ensure reliable communications.

The overall purpose of GSETT-2 is to obtain practical experience for evaluating the concept of a global seismological verification system described in the Group's fifth report (CD/903). Evaluation and assessment of the results of the tests conducted is thus an essential element of GSETT-2. During its session, the Group discussed evaluation criteria for GSETT-2, based on draft guidelines worked out by a specially appointed study group. A tentative evaluation scheme will be tested during the forthcoming experiment this autumn.

The Group spent considerable time during the session planning the further activities of GSETT-2. Until the Group's next session, GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, preparing ourselves for the full-scale operational test. In addition to preparatory work and testing at National and International Data Centres, a co-ordinated experimental exchange of data will be carried out during the period 15 October-2 November 1990. This test will facilitate the establishment of reliable means of communication, which is a fundamental element of GSETT-2.

The full-scale test of GSETT-2, referred to as Phase 3, will be carried out in two parts. The first part will take place this autumn from 26 November to 2 December. It will involve the exchange of both Level I and Level II data obtained from all participating stations for 7 consecutive "data days" and processing of that data at the four Experimental International Data Centres. To operate the system for 7 consecutive "data days" - which means that, taking into account all the processing at EIDCs, the whole system will operate for 14 days - will be an important test of the ability of the system to cope with large volumes of data for an extended time period. It will thus pave the way for the second and main part of Phase 3 of GSETT-2, full-scale operation of the system for a continuous period of about two months, which is tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be held at Geneva from 11 to 22 February 1991.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, for introducting the Group's report, document CD/1032. I think I am expressing the feeling of the Conference in saying how much we appreciate what has been done by the Ad hoc Group and Dr. Dahlman in that Group. It is my intention to put before the Conference for decision, at its next plenary meeting, the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts (CD/1032) concerning the holding of the Group's next session, namely from 11 to 22 February 1991 at Geneva.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): My statement this morning is rather unusual because I am speaking on behalf of the delegations of both the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil.

Our two countries have greatly appreciated the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with the item which rightly holds first place among those the Conference has to consider with the aim of ensuring international peace and security. The Conference has been able to establish an institutional framework to serve as a setting for an exercise which, under the terms of the mandate we have given the Committee, will be of a practical nature and can be defined as the first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. As countries which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear military option, Brazil and Argentina are ready to play an active and constructive part in this undertaking. In this regard, we feel prompted to offer a few preliminary remarks.

First of all, we believe that there should be no doubt as to the final goal of the exercise. We are here to draw up a comprehensive agreement that will put an end to all test nuclear explosions in all environments by all States for all time. This seemingly simple statement nevertheless requires us to bear in mind that the task before us, no matter how quickly or in what order we set about it, must be guided by the objective of a universal, non-discriminatory agreement. That is not one objective among many, it is the central aim of the process we are about to undertake. Any attempt to belittle it, or to put undue emphasis on lesser topics, would be a sure recipe for failure and deadlock of the kind that has previously frustrated efforts by the Conference to advance towards this elusive goal of the international community.

The Committee's mandate clearly indicates that we have to concentrate our work on four main areas: structure, scope, verification and compliance. It further states that these are interrelated issues. In this specific context, interrelationship acquires a special meaning, since it rules out the repetition of scenarios familiar to this Conference at past sessions, when our delegations met here to address various aspects of the verification arrangements provided for an agreement that paradoxically was not itself subject to direct consideration in this body. So we were confronted with an unquestionably anomalous situation, which has fortunately been corrected.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

In our view, there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to the conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. What is more, in recent years significant progress has been made both technically and conceptually on the issue of verification, rendering a lengthy debate on the subject unnecessary. The general approach will, in our view, have to be open and at the same time have to avoid selective treatment, since each element of the mandate will have to be analysed in the light of the progress made in the consideration of the others.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a logical concomitant of an international situation which is developing positively and, as has recently been acknowledged by one of the existing military alliances, enables us to envisage a world where the role of the nuclear component of existing arsenals will be substantially diminished. As we all know, nuclear weapon tests today have a clear purpose: the updating of existing arsenals and the incorporation into them of new, more accurate and lethal systems. Not only is this modernization process stimulated by the nuclear tests the nuclear Powers conduct; such tests could be said to be an essential prerequisite of it. In brief, nuclear weapon tests are necessary tools for the continuation of the strategic arms race in its highest and most sophisticated form. The rate at which nuclear tests are being carried out confirms that their essential purpose is the development of new generations of these weapons. It would certainly be most difficult to design new weapons without the support of test explosions.

The clear conclusion for us onlookers in this costly contest is that if the road to a nuclear test ban is blocked, then this must be construed as a lack of political will to leave the arms race definitively behind. In this context, if the talks between the two major nuclear Powers on their strategic systems become a vehicle for the modernization of their respective arsenals, then it makes perfect sense to refuse to adhere to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests. How can we reconcile the fact that, perhaps very shortly, two military alliances may be signing a solemn declaration that they no longer regard each other as adversaries with the continuation of these test programmes? These activities seem to demonstrate not only that there is a lack of interest in resolving one of the most pressing items on the Conference's agenda, but also that proliferation in all its dimensions continues without respite. Nor should it be forgotten that refusal to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is not consistent with legally binding obligations stemming from a variety of international instruments.

A treaty such as we have in mind must, in order to have at least a modicum of credibility, be drawn up with the active participation of all the Powers at present carrying out nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, it should not become an instrument whereby continued testing is condoned through phased schemes that guarantee and permit it at lower yields.

The foregoing is merely to say that, in order to avoid prompt frustration, our efforts must bear the stamp of credibility and consistency between our presence here and our respective national security policies.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

Our statement thus far has focused on the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States, in other words, States that carry out nuclear test explosions. All of them, without exception, bear a primary responsibility for this process since it is they who will actually have to halt testing. It must be recognized, however, that a multilateral effort of this kind comprises a larger number of participants. That is why, given the interests at stake, the task at hand is essentially multilateral. Its implications and scope will determine relations of complementarity with other existing instruments governing States' nuclear activities: for example, in our own region, with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This example, which can also be applied to other areas such as the South Pacific, will call for a detailed effort of compatibilization between different norms.

It should also be remembered that, as is the case in other fields such as chemical weapons or outer space, any agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests completely will have to include provisions to cover the interests of States in all the peaceful applications of nuclear power. Brazil and Argentina, as everyone is aware, are among those States which for many years have vigorously pursued programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, to the unquestionable priority that both our countries recognize to the security aspects of such an agreement, we add the priorities that derive from our technological development needs.

The peaceful course of our nuclear programmes is and always has been aimed at the attainment of a level of development that will enable us to take autonomous decisions in the energy field. In a highly technological world, with serious supply problems, not having our own scientific and technological base would create a situation of technological dependence that would seriously affect our shared objectives of economic and social development. Therefore we believe that, in elaborating something as special as an international treaty to halt nuclear weapon tests and including mechanisms for ensuring compliance, care must be taken to avoid provisions which might create unnecessary controls or additional constraints on the transfer of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Argentina and Brazil are carrying through a policy based on these principles: co-operation, openness and mutual confidence are its linchpins. This nuclear co-operation, which extends to the private sector in both States, has become closer since the taking of the political decision to promote and expand economic integration. The degree of mutual confidence thus generated between us could hardly be matched, in its practical outcome, by any existing mechanism of international control. Precisely because we do not ignore the importance of the security aspects related to nuclear activities, we have set up unique instruments of co-operation and harmonization for our joint policy on the major international issues in the nuclear sphere. These instruments are well known, and perhaps the experience we have so far gained bilaterally in Latin America could be helpful when it comes to setting up the machinery to link the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty with existing international and other accords. Similarly, we wish to restate our commitment to the development of peaceful nuclear technologies without hindrance and free from measures re-establishing in international relations hierarchical orders which have proved not only inefficient but, even worse, unjust.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

The complete cessation of nuclear weapon testing is a long-standing goal of our countries, along with the vast majority of the international community. We are ready to work actively to bring it about. It will be no easy task but, given the necessary commitment by everyone, the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement to end nuclear testing within a reasonable time should not be an over-idealistic goal. For Brazil and Argentina, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty admits of no further delay. As in other relevant aspects of the disarmament agenda, our countries will strive to see to it that instruments designed to bring about peace and stability do not serve to restrict our economic and social development. The two objectives are perfectly reconcilable, as are the nuclear policies of Argentina and Brazil. Perhaps that is why our Governments have instructed our delegations to speak today with a single voice in this historic council chamber.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán, for the statement he has just made on behalf of his own country and of Brazil. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

M. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to welcome you to your post and to express the deep gratitude of the Soviet delegation for the contribution which you have already made to the work of this Conference. Thanks in large measure to your skilful guidance, the Conference is being quite successful in overcoming all the difficulties connected with preparing its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. We are also pleased to welcome in your person a representative of courageous Romania, a country to which we are bound by long-standing and cordial relations. After the overthrow of the dictatorship and Romania's entry on the road of democratic reforms, these relations have acquired a new, broader dimension. We are also pleased to note how the constructive activity of Romania has increased in international disarmament forums and we should like to wish you every success, Mr. President, in concluding the current session and we are convinced that you will represent our forum with distinction during the inter-sessional period.

Similarly, I should like to express our gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Bogumil Sujka, and Oswaldo de Rivero, for their great contributions to the work of the Conference in June and July respectively. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to wish Ambassador de Rivero every success in his forthcoming important role as Chairman of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT Treaty. His experience and knowledge of multilateral disarmament issues, and his diplomacy augur well for the success of that Conference.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to share its views on the main item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - the question which consumes most of our time and effort and which, at the same time, is the most promising. I am speaking of course about the prohibition of chemical weapons. In addition, I propose, in view of the review conference of the 1972 Convention to be held next year, to touch upon the problem of bacteriological biological weapons.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

But first, the negotiations on chemical weapons. The Ad hoc Committee chaired by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, whose efforts we appreciate so highly, has basically finished its work for this session. We already know what new provisions will be included in its report and what changes will be made in the "rolling text". On comparing this text with the previous one, in document CD/961, one comes involuntarily to the rather unpleasant conclusion that not that much progress has been done this year.

Actually, this fact, of itself, need not be and is not so depressing, since often in negotiations periods of rapid progress are followed by periods of reflection and preparation of new breakthroughs. The main reason for our concern at the present state of affairs is some trends that have emerged in the negotiations this year and manifested themselves throughout the summer.

Above all, we are truly concerned over the lack of progress in resolving key political aspects of the question of banning chemical weapons. After all, not many of those aspects were left. At the beginning of this year the Soviet delegation called for focusing attention precisely on the search for solutions to them. Searching there has indeed been, but we are not much closer to the solutions. All too often forward movement has been bogged down in endless discussions over details which, despite their importance, do not determine the essence of States' rights and obligations under the future convention.

Of course, we still have some leeway for working out technical details, but to my mind it will be extremely small if nothing changes on the main issue, namely the extent of agreement on the key aspects of the future convention. On that, more often than not, we are going round in circles, a fact which does not bring us any closer to final results. Sometimes we even witness backward movement, with the sudden revival during the negotiations of positions already abandoned by their authors and taking no account of the tremendous amount of work done over the past few years. Moreover, sometimes we engage in a kind of diplomatic minuet, with old positions being taken up by people who convincingly criticized them in the past.

In this respect, we cannot but agree with Ambassador von Stülpnagel, who, in his farewell statement at the Conference on 24 April this year, said that belabouring problems is not necessarily the best way to arrive at better solutions and diagnosed us as sometimes simply lacking the will to achieve results. Unfortunately, several months after the departure of Ambassador von Stülpnagel his words still remain valid.

Nevertheless, we do not share the view sometimes heard in the corridors that lately the situation in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons has seriously deteriorated. The difficulties we are faced with today are rather the result of the fact that concerns which until recently remained latent are now starting to surface. We are going through a complex and sometimes painful process of maturing of the major political problems whose resolution should pave the way for a final breakthrough in the negotiations.

I believe that the experience gained at this session gives us grounds for suggesting the preparation of a package solution to these problems. The point of it, in our opinion, would be to undertake a political search for proper

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balances between the interests of the negotiating States over the entire subject-matter of the negotiations. Indeed, today the question of the future convention is increasingly taking on a political dimension. The time is coming for responsible, principled solutions, which probably cannot be arrived at solely through the language of the draft Convention and the annexes.

We therefore support the idea of convening, in the relatively near future, a special meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at the level of Foreign Ministers, about which the Ambassador of France, Mr. Pierre Morel, in particular recently spoke so convincingly. We believe that the purpose of meeting should be to overcome the remaining obstacles in the way of the convention. At such a meeting the ministers could, for example, approve the main provisions of the convention and give delegations instructions to finalize as soon as possible the necessary technical documents and annexes to the convention so that the draft could be opened for signature by Heads of State or Government before the end of 1991.

Sometimes doubts are expressed about whether it is advisable to convene a ministerial meeting if it does not go beyond repeating old positions and making general appeals while the problems would remain unresolved. In our view, a meeting of that kind is, indeed, unnecessary. But what is being talked about is a productive meeting. For that, we feel, there must be agreement in principle as soon as possible on beginning the practical preparations for a meeting having as its focus the development of a package of understandings of principle.

Let us consider the following scenario. Although I am not certain that it is altogether the correct one, perhaps it may be advisable to ask the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, who this year made such a tangible contribution to our negotiations, to initiate as of now consultations on the question of convening a ministerial meeting so that definite decisions could be reached in New York.

Of course, an essential, but by no means the only condition for the success of a ministerial meeting is that we should all understand clearly exactly what we expect from the convention and what problems we want to resolve through it. It goes without saying that for anyone to be without instructions for protracted periods does not facilitate negotiations. There is a Russian proverb: seven persons do not wait for only one. And here we sometimes find ourselves in a situation where seventy parties must wait for one. But this seems to be our fate at multilateral negotiations.

The work carried out by the Ad hoc Committee this year has, in our view, helped to identify clearly enough the set of problems on which political solutions are needed. These include: the verification system and, first of all, challenge and ad hoc inspections, ensuring the universality of the future convention, the question of non-use of chemical weapons, as well as assistance in protection against chemical attacks; co-operation in peaceful chemistry; and sanctions. In addition to these problems, but somewhat separate from them, are the question of the composition of the Executive Council of the international organization and the question of its financing. I should like to dwell on some of these issues.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

As stated by many representatives who took the floor before me, for the future convention to be an effective tool for ensuring security, it must have an effective verification mechanism. Such a mechanism is inconceivable without challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections which, as the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, said, must create confidence that the stocks declared really do constitute all the stocks, and that the facilities declared are indeed all the facilities. If that is so, then the essence of the problem is how to conduct such inspections at facilities not declared by States under the convention.

There is probably no need to recall in detail that the Soviet Union's attitude towards this form of international verification suggested by the United States in 1984 has not always been positive. At first, what prevailed in our approach was apprehension that abuse of such inspections might result in the disclosure of sensitive information not related to the convention. However, in 1987, after assessing the needs of verification from the point of view of the total banning of chemical weapons, from the point of view of the specific tasks our convention must fulfil and in the light of the declared positions of other participants in the negotiations, the Soviet Union made an important political decision to support the inclusion in the convention of provisions on irrefusable challenge inspections with respect to any location or any facility at any time upon the request of any member State and without any exceptions.

As a result of joint efforts by the participants in the negotiations, and of consultations held by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons over several years, we were, I think, able to formulate by the beginning of this a generally acceptable concept of challenge inspections. It combines the possibility of inspecting any location with measures, based on the use of alternative methods of inspection and the concept of managed access, to prevent abuse. What is more, this approach has proved itself in several trial inspections conducted by negotiating parties. The Soviet Union has also conducted its own national challenge inspection, and with the same conclusions, although it must be said that it is the United Kingdom which has the richest and most valuable experience in this field.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the document on challenge inspections prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in April and then improved during the summer consultations is a good basis for agreement. In particular, we consider a good idea the provision in that document to the effect that, where necessary, the decision as to the suitability of alternative measures shall be taken by the Director General of the future organization. The Soviet delegation regrets that this language has not been included in the draft convention, where we would like to see it. We hope that the work on the Chairman's document regarding the text of article IX of the convention will be continued and finalized during the inter-sessional period.

In our view, it is also important to make further efforts to develop the important verification measure of ad hoc inspections. Obviously, the final solution to this question cannot be found outside the context of the verification system as a whole, including both challenge inspections and routine inspections, since each of these measures must play its specific role

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in the mechanism of the future convention, complementing the others. On the other hand, the work already done on ad hoc inspections has revealed a whole range of interesting approaches capable, to our mind, of increasing the objectivity of the verification system and making it more flexible.

As for the Soviet Union, it supports the idea of conducting ad hoc inspections both at the request of States parties and at the initiative of the bodies to be set up pursuant to the convention, on the basis of agreed yearly quotas which would not put any State in a disadvantageous position. From that point of view, we welcome the document on ad hoc inspections introduced by the United States delegation. We believe, however, that the pivot of the proposal on ad hoc inspections - the idea of establishing registers of national chemical industries - is not yet fully developed. Perhaps the difficulties which some delegations are experiencing with respect to the concept of ad hoc inspections stem precisely from lack of clarity as to precisely which facilities would be subject to such inspections and, hence, what in practice these inspections can add to routine inspections and challenge inspections.

The results of the present year have shown that ultimately both the success of our negotiations and that of the convention in general depend on finding a solution to the problem of universality of the future convention. It seems rather difficult to find a single, universal formula for the solution of the universality problem. In this respect, States' declarations of their intention to become original signatories of the convention, regional initiatives, the involvement of parliaments, to bilateral diplomatic contacts, and work within the United Nations framework, including at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, all merit attention and support. It might also be worthwhile considering establishing a system of additional incentives to join the future convention and the possibility of introducing additional restrictions on the export of specific chemical products to countries that refuse to become parties.

Ensuring for the future convention universality guaranteeing the destruction of chemical weapons all over the world is the aim of the proposal by the USSR and the United States which provides for the convening at the end of the eighth year after the convention's entry into force of a special forum to determine whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for proceeding to the complete destruction of the remaining minimal stocks of chemical weapons. This proposal has caused varying responses and at times criticism. With all due respect to the views of those who do not agree with the essence of this proposal, I would like to try to clarify certain misunderstandings, which I believe lie at the basis of this criticism.

First of all, there is and can be no question of changing the future convention into a non-proliferation treaty. The USSR/United States proposal does not repeal to any degree the obligation completely to destroy chemical weapons, not to mention chemical weapons production facilities. On the contrary, the point of it is precisely that all States without exception should be in an equal position as regards chemical weapons. Moreover, this proposal is designed, at least in the view of its authors, to encourage States that today have chemical weapons to join as soon as possible in the process of confidence-building and openness and to be among the first parties to the future convention. Lastly, it should be noted that, unlike the now familiar

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original idea of 2 per cent, the decision to proceed to the final stage of chemical weapons destruction will not be taken individually by the States possessing chemical weapons but will be a matter for consideration at a conference of all the parties to the convention. We are prepared for a substantive discussion of the proposal to hold such a conference in order to study all the problems in detail and to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.

Naturally, the universality of the convention depends in large measure on its content, on how far it meets the future parties' vital security interests. From this point of view, a key issue is how the convention resolves the problem of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. For its part, the Soviet delegation is firmly in favour of including in the convention an obligation for absolute and unconditional prohibition of any use of chemical weapons.

At the same time, we support the proposal to work out collective measures to counteract the use of chemical weapons. To that end, there might be concluded between States parties and the Technical Secretariat special agreements specifying the forms, types and order of assistance to be provided pursuant to decisions of the Executive Council. Such machinery for mutual assistance might include, as an integral component, a voluntary fund to provide assistance to States parties in the event of the use against them of chemical weapons. The fund could be made up of contributions in cash and in kind, including the provision of means of protection against chemical weapons. Moreover, we are prepared to support the proposal that if chemical weapons are used against a State party to the convention, the Director General could take a decision, in consultation with members of the Executive Council, to provide emergency assistance to that State party, primarily assistance of a humanitarian nature.

The road to ensuring the universality of the convention passes as well through practical preparation by States parties to participate in the agreement. Such preparation may take various forms. It may include trial inspections, co-operation in the development of instruments, establishment of national structures to ensure compliance with the convention, and lastly the drafting of required changes in national legislation. In this respect, we welcome the decision by the President of Argentina to establish to study questions pertaining to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons a national commission which, as Ambassador García Moritán stated, is intended as a prototype of a national body for the implementation of the convention.

We also welcome the efforts by Finland to establish a laboratory network for the future convention, and in particular we state that the Soviet Union is ready to participate in the inter-laboratory test scheduled for this autumn. The USSR has designated the laboratory of the Shikhany military facility for this test.

For the Soviet Union, practical preparation for participation in the future convention is basically connected with the implementation of the bilateral USSR-United States Agreement on the non-production and destruction of chemical weapons, and to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding regarding a verification experiment and data exchange.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

A national chemical weapons destruction programme is currently under consideration in the Soviet Union. The draft programme was submitted in April of this year to the Supreme Soviet and is now being examined in the Supreme Soviet's subsidiary bodies. The draft, in the preparation of which 18 ministries and government departments took part, contains several options for the destruction of USSR chemical weapons stocks - options which differ from one another both as to the number of destruction facilities planned and their location, and, of course, as to cost. The extreme options provide either for the setting-up of a single national destruction centre or for the construction of destruction facilities at every chemical weapons storage site. Priority attention is given to the protection of the environment, of facility personnel and of the population in the area of facilities. For our part, we intend to spare no effort to implement the provisions of the bilateral agreement, which provides for destruction to begin no later than 1992, for the annual rate of destruction to attain 1,000 tonnes in 1995, for 50 per cent of stocks to be destroyed no later than 1999, and for reduction to the level of 5,000 tonnes by the year 2002.

On the whole the USSR-United States process of data exchange and visits to the respective military chemical facilities in both countries pursuant to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding is developing successfully. The first exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities took place early in June. The end of August will see the completion of the second round of visits, which are much broader in scope, and during which Soviet and United States experts will visit a number of chemical weapons production and storage facilities as well as civilian chemical plants. The visit of Soviet experts to the United States has already taken place and soon there will be a return visit of United States experts to the USSR. The USSR and the United States plan to complete the programme of visits in the framework of the first stage of the Memorandum early next year.

In conclusion, I would like to share some views concerning the Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in September 1991. I believe that the experience of implementation of this Convention has shown its weak point: the absence of a system of effective verification of compliance and the lack of a well-developed mechanism for the implementation of confidence-building and openness measures. This situation may be explained to a large extent by the period during which the Convention was drawn up and by the approaches of the time to issues of international verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, the Convention is an example of the great responsibility shown at that time by all States, which demonstrated in practice that, when there is political will to conclude a disarmament agreement, even the absence of a solution to the verification problem is not an obstacle.

A great deal has changed since then: verification and openness issues have ceased to be a stumbling-block in negotiations. At any rate, that is our hope. The experience of collective work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons provides an ample picture of what a system of international verification and openness in the framework of a multilateral treaty may look like under the new conditions. We believe that the time has come to reconsider

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

approaches to the Biological Weapons Convention from these positions - bearing in mind, of course, the particularities of the subject-matter of that Convention.

The Soviet delegation believes that verification of compliance with the Convention could include, for example, exchange of agreed data; inspections at declared facilities; and challenge inspections of those sites and facilities with regard to which suspicion of breaches arises. We reaffirm our support for the idea of setting out agreed measures to strengthen the verification system in an additional protocol to the Convention.

Thought might, for example, be given to the following possibility for resolving this problem. States parties to the Convention would compile national biological registers listing all facilities P4 of biological protection, as well as all facilities with a lower level of protection if they carry out work on protection against biological weapons (irrespective of who orders that work) or perform any other activities on instructions from the Ministry of Defence. Facilities included in national biological registers would be subject to a kind of "initial inspection" and thereafter to inspections at any time, without the right of refusal. If necessary, a quota system could be devised for inspections of this kind. In addition, the verification mechanism might include challenge inspections at undeclared facilities. Of course, it would also be necessary to develop and to agree upon inspection procedures that would enable the facts to be established in cases of breach of the Convention but would not lead to the disclosure of confidential information that was not relevant to such cases.

As to confidence-building and openness measures, they might include roughly the following steps: exchanges of visits to facilities that would be declared under the data exchange; encouragement for declassification of activities of relevance to the Convention; exchange (and secondment) of scientists, including scientists working at declared facilities; organization of joint research, primarily research on prevention and treatment of natural disease caused by agents that are potentially dangerous from the point of view of biological and toxin weapons; establishment of an international data bank on activities performed in various countries that are of direct relevance to the Convention. All these measures might be considered at the forthcoming Review Conference of the Convention.

An important direction for efforts to prepare a successful Conference might be expansion of the participation of States parties to the Convention, as well as of other countries, in the exchange of relevant data, as provided for in the recommendations of the previous, 1986 Conference. Without general participation in already agreed confidence-building measures and scrupulous implementation of the initial agreements on that score, it would be difficult to talk about the agreement and execution of new, broader measures in this field.

The ban placed on biological weapons by the Convention must become truly global, and that naturally requires accession to the Convention by all States. We urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the forthcoming 1991 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to be an important event. We believe that forum should assess the results achieved since 1986 in increasing the effectiveness of the Convention and agree upon further measures to strengthen the régime established under the Convention. The Soviet Union intends actively to participate in efforts to ensure the success of the Conference and is ready favourably to consider any constructive ideas and proposals from other countries aimed at strengthening this very important international agreement in the field of actual disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for his kind and cordial words concerning the Chair, my country and Romanian-Soviet relations.

I now call on the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, to introduce his report on the informal open-ended consultations concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been distributed as document CD/WP.395.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I have asked for the floor to present the report on the informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, which I had the honour of chairing. The report is contained in document CD/WP.395 which has been circulated today.

The subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament has been under review for several years already. At the beginning of this year's session, a number of speakers reiterated the view that the Conference needed to constantly adapt itself to unfolding events in the outside world, perhaps now more than ever before. These ideas fell on fertile ground, and informal open-ended consultations were initiated in an effort to address the two central themes of procedural review and substantive adaptation. The consultations which took place subsequently were noticeably open, frank and thorough, and resulted in consensus on a number of issues. The report contained in document CD/WP.395 details the major trends of the discussions and identifies the areas in which consensus was seen to emerge.

Some of these points of consensus - for example, those relating to the change in the schedule of the annual session and its division henceforth into three parts; the reduction in the overall number of plenary meetings; the manner in which subsidiary bodies and their mandates are to be established and the simplification of the programme of work - would require immediate decision and the Conference will hopefully decide about them before the current session ends.

Several other elements of consensus are also important because they represent widely shared hopes and desires. There was hope, for example, that the fundamental rule of consensus which governs the working of the Conference would be implemented with some flexibility, particularly where vital national interests were not involved. There was hope that delegations would make greater efforts to limit their interventions in the plenaries to 15 minutes.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

There was hope that the positive and constructive procedure followed this year to enable the maximum number of non-member States to participate in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies would continue in future years also.

In sum, therefore, this series of consultations has shown above all the willingness of the Conference to move forward in the consideration of its improved and effective functioning and to keep the subject under continuing review, not only in a constant and obvious effort at self-improvement, but also because of the overriding need to adapt itself substantively to a changing world. The consultations are therefore to be seen as the beginning of a process - a happy beginning, which I had the honour to share.

Before concluding, I would like to express my personal thanks to all the member delegations of the Conference for their committed and assiduous participation in the consultations and to the Secretary-General and his staff for the particularly useful inputs and support received from them.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his introduction to the report in document CD/WP.395, which was distributed today in the Conference room. I have asked the secretariat to distribute an informal paper with a draft decision on some of the points of the report just introduced by Ambassador Kamal. It is my intention to invite the Conference next Tuesday, when we have heard the entire list of speakers, to take note with appreciation of that report. Subsequently, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider the draft decision in the informal paper the secretariat distributed today. Immediately thereafter we shall resume the plenary meeting to adopt the draft decision.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marin Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of 21. But, beforehand, I should like to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference for this month and assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation.

(continued in English) The Group of 21 should like to put on record its deep appreciation for the manner in which Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan has been conducting the informal consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. The report on these consultations, contained in document CD/WP.395, has just been introduced and the Conference will have to take a number of decisions regarding several organizational aspects of our work. The Group of 21 expresses the hope that the proposed changes in our annual sessions and in the number of plenary meetings will contribute, however modestly, to our work.

The Group regrets that in 1990 the Conference has again failed to advance substantially in its consideration of its agenda items. On seven of the eight items negotiations have yet to begin and even on the elimination of chemical weapons, the expectations and optimism of February have given way to increasing frustration in August.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The Group therefore wishes to reiterate its position that the best way of enhancing the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament would be to produce tangible results with regard to the items on its agenda. For this to occur, the members of the Conference will have to demonstrate greater political will to move forward on the substantive issues before us as well as on several other questions which were discussed in the informal consultations and which are identified in the report we have received this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me also to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and to pledge to you the full co-operation of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Conference on Disarmament winds up its 1990 session, I want to take a moment to look at the chemical weapons negotiations and share some observations about where we have been and where we have yet to go. When I first arrived here in Geneva, in January this year, there seemed to me to be great optimism and enthusiasm that a chemical weapons ban was within sight. All of us were transfixed by the political changes sweeping across Europe. Arms control and security negotiations, so long tended, were finally beginning to bear fruit. Conclusion of a strategic arms reduction treaty seemed imminent. Agreement on significant reductions in conventional arms in Europe was within grasp. On chemical weapons, the prospect of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could be seen on the horizon. All these events combined to fuel expectations that 1990 might also be the year we gave real impetus to the multilateral chemical weapons convention.

Progress has, however, not been what we had hoped for this year. For the United States part, our review of chemical weapons issues was only concluded this month. But many others in this room contributed to the delay as well and, as the United States made its conclusions known on several vital questions, a certain atmosphere of recrimination and finger-pointing replaced the dispassionate discussion of national perspectives that should be the medium of serious negotiation. We are likely to conclude this session of our Conference, I regret to say, on a sour note.

Actually, we did get many things done. Much of our progress centred on legal and institutional issues. Development of the two-tiered approach for changing and amending the treaty was significant. To be effective the convention cannot be frozen in time. It needs to be flexible and mutable, adaptable to advances both in science and in verification technology. At the same time, it needs to be able to withstand erosion or elimination of the core of the treaty - those fundamental obligations which will make the convention a truly comprehensive ban. The work we accomplished here this year ensures that the convention will be able to do both.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Some progress was also made in incorporating provisions in the convention on settlement of disputes and sanctions. The United States was initially sceptical. Consultations with delegations here, and review of your arguments in Washington, however, pursuaded us that the chemical weapons convention might usefully include such provisions. Each sovereign party must, of course, make decisions for itself about whether others are complying with their obligations under the convention. The treaty organization might, however, recommend or suggest to States parties measures which could include sanctions in response to violations.

We have pressed further ahead on jurisdiction and control. We will all need to decide the extent to which each of us is able to enforce our laws with respect to activities in the private sector and outside the boundaries of our countries. The United States is confident that we will succeed in narrowing our differences.

The order of destruction for eliminating chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities was worked out and incorporated into the rolling text. This complex, technical section provides the framework for States' preparations and plans, and sets out a practical system which can accommodate the destruction requirements, not only of the two States that have already declared their chemical weapons but also of those that have yet to do so.

We also made important progress on a number of technical issues, including agreement on a common definition of production capacity and thresholds for monitoring the chemical industry, and on provisions for declaration of past transfers of chemical weapons. We also made some progress in the area of schedules and guidelines, where nearly all of us agree on the importance of covering toxins under this convention.

Another issue on which there has been movement is "old chemical weapons". No one disputes that under the convention chemical weapons will not be retained and will be declared and destroyed. All of us seem to accept that the presence of chemical weapons on the territory of a State party will trigger the obligation to declare their existence, regardless of whether they are that State party's or another country's chemical weapons. We all acknowledged this year, however, that the circumstances for chemical weapons being present on a country's territory differ. These differing circumstances give rise to the differences in approaches and attitudes concerning countries' responsibilities for the disposition of old chemical weapon stocks. The United States believes we will ultimately find a solution. We are confident that this can be done without opening up questions of reparation or debates about history.

The United States believes that this body has made remarkable progress toward the conclusion of a comprehensive and global chemical weapons ban since active negotiations got under way six years ago. If the pace has not met everyone's expectations recently, perhaps it is because the problem has changed since we first began. The primary goal then was to bring the United States and the USSR together to eliminate their chemical weapons capabilities. For a sizeable number of delegations around this room, a chemical weapons ban was an East-West, a United States/Soviet problem. CW is no longer primarily a United States/Soviet problem. The United States and the Soviet Union are the

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

only two countries in this room which have publicly declared themselves to be chemical-weapon States and taken active steps to begin eliminating their capabilities. For our part, the United States' new chemical weapons destruction facility at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific began test destruction operations last month with nerve-agent-filled munitions, in preparation for full-scale operations in 1991. This past June we also successfully completed destruction of the entire United States stockpile of the incapacitating agent BZ.

The plain truth is that as I speak the United States is chemically disarming. Not only has the United States ceased its production of chemical weapons, but it has also actually begun the process of dismantling nearly all its deterrent capability.

In June, the Soviet and United States delegations jointly tabled a proposal that our two Presidents thought might help promote universality. In that agreement, our two countries agreed to cease production and begin destroying our stocks before the multilateral treaty is even concluded. We have further agreed that, within eight years of the treaty's entry into force, we will both have destroyed all our chemical weapon stocks except for 500 agent tons - in other words, between 98 and 99 per cent of what we started with. If at that point we have been joined by the countries that have turned what began as a bilateral problem into a global threat, then we will destroy the remaining stocks as well.

The United States and the USSR did not make this proposal to divide these negotiations or, as some claim, to turn the comprehensive convention into a partial ban. The only way it will be a partial ban is if others - many of whom are here today - fail to do their part. We do not want or intend to retain chemical weapons indefinitely. Quite the contrary. The United States wishes to see all chemical weapons - and I emphasize the word "all" - eliminated. But we will not be the only chemical-weapon States to eliminate our stocks, while others who are part of the global CW threat stay out of the convention. This would plainly be discrimination in reverse, something we are astonished to hear advocated by countries traditionally so committed to equality.

No one here today can know with any certainty which States will have adhered and which will have chemical weapons eight years into the treaty régime. The United States believes stablility is best enhanced by assessing the situation together at the eight-year conference. If our critics have constructive ideas for better ways to accomplish this, we will be happy to hear them.

A similar misunderstanding of United States intentions seems to centre on how this convention deals with responses to the use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. On the one hand, some delegations see this issue very narrowly as the types of assistance others would be obligated to give to them. Others see it as a way of pre-establishing procedures and arrangements for facilitating and expediting the provision of assistance in the event they or others are attacked or threatened with chemical weapons. The United States is willing to discuss various approaches to assistance, but we consider assistance to be only one aspect of how to respond to the use of CW. Another

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aspect is deterrence, i.e., the counterthreat of retaliation so long as CW stocks remain. This is the aspect, though, that no one wants to discuss in terms of the real world.

The United States has said simply that, if we are attacked with chemical weapons, we must have a variety of response options, including the option to respond in kind so long as we still have some chemical weapons. We earnestly wish that such precautions were unnecessary. But, as the sad developments of the last two weeks show all too clearly, setting a good example is not enough. The United States must ask why many delegations seem more concerned about the United States than about outlaw States that are all too ready to brandish their well-practised CW capabilities in support of aggressive designs.

The United States delegation would like to think that this summer has been one of the last stages before bringing our negotiations to conclusion. We need to be realistic though. What lies ahead is resolution of issues which have confronted and confounded us since 1984. The polemics and procedural challenges we have all witnessed this summer are indications to me that we have reached the inevitable phase in our work when the tough questions are at last on the table.

When we return to these negotiations later this fall and next year, the United States delegation will be ready to roll up its sleeves and grapple with the remaining issues.

We will want to hear then more from our Chinese colleagues about their new challenge inspection proposals. We would like to hear from our Peruvian colleagues about the ideas they have just proposed for protecting the environment. We want to have a real exchange with non-aligned delegations on the interrelationship of routine, ad hoc, and challenge inspections, and we want to explain why we believe a three-part verification system creates the most effective and least confrontational régime possible for building confidence in compliance.

The United States has no hidden agenda. We continue to be committed to concluding a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons. The agreement the United States adheres to, however, will not be a lowest-common-denominator arrangement set forth in ambiguities that paper over real differences. We understand the reluctance, particularly after weeks of negotiating, to accommodate late-coming positions or controversial views. But none of us will let our vital security interests be overridden.

It says something about the artificial, rarified atmosphere of this Conference that we are concluding our work for the session by concentrating so intensely on footnotes and brackets, while in the real world the aggressive use of chemical weapons is boldly and quite credibly threatened. Let us move our work to conclusion in a spirit of compromise, excluding extraneous goals, so that the force of legal obligation and deterrent power of effective verification prevent this from happening again.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

(The President)

I have no further speakers on my list. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage of our work? That is not the case.

As I announced earlier today, I shall now submit to the Conference for adoption the reports of the Ad hoc Committees contained in documents CD/1027 and 1028. I propose that we proceed now to the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I propose that we consider now the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1028. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I have just learned that the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Peter Dietze, will be leaving Geneva soon and that he will not be in Geneva next week when we complete our work for this session. This plenary meeting is the last one he will be attending. I should like to emphasize the positive role that Ambassador Dietze has played in the Conference. His professional skill, his diplomacy and his commitment to the Conference, together with his cordial nature, have made a valuable contribution to our work throughout the years he has spent with us. On behalf of the Conference, I extend to him and to his wife our very best wishes.

I give the floor to Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, I would like to thank you very much for the kind words you have addressed to me for the work I accomplished as head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament.

As you said, the Conference on Disarmament terminates its summer session next week and I will not be in Geneva until the end of September. Therefore permit me, following a tradition of this forum, to place on record some personal remarks. In turn, these remarks are not so personal as the conclusion of my work at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is causally related to the sweeping and historic changes which have taken place in my country and all over Eastern Europe in the past months.

Important developments have been unfolding. There is no telling what the impact on international co-operation, including in the field of disarmament, will be. It is, however, quite certain, I think, that these developments will bring us closer to the jointly avowed aim of a world without weapons and wars, and I think this is borne out by the recent steps of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as by the continuation of the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Vienna, to mention only a few examples.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

In a few weeks time, the German Democratic Republic will be incorporated into a united Germany - a Germany, I believe, feeling committed to freedom, human dignity and democracy, a Germany taking part in the construction of a new and unified Europe and in the creation of new forms of good-neighbourly relations, a Germany, I believe, resolutely campaigning for security, disarmament and arms control. Wherever we Germans will be led by history, it is, I am firmly convinced, the will of our people that never again war, but only peace, shall emanate from German soil. We have learned our historical lesson.

I belong to the generation that witnessed the horrors of the Second World War and the time after - a generation that knows what war means. This has probably been my key experience that induced me to do everything to ensure that this will not happen again and that headway be made on the road to disarmament notwithstanding all the obstacles. I was 12 years old when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded. In the following year I experienced the founding of the German Democratic Republic. I have been, in the true sense of the word, a child of this country. I have grown up in this part of Germany, and this is my home. In September 1973 I was present in New York when the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted as equal members of the world community to the United Nations Organization. In all the following years, I believe, I tried to contribute my share to dealing peacefully with one another, developing prosperous international co-operaation and setting the stage for the conditions in Europe to be created as they exist today. With the unification of Germany, for me, the wheel turns full circle. The division of Germany and the division of Europe has now become part of history - and that is good.

The fact that at the next session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament only one Ambassador will represent the united Germany in this room, is a visible expression of the march of events. And I am convinced that a fresh start will be made resulting from the increased responsibility not only for a peaceful and unified Europe but also for this unique multilateral disarmament forum. In the past years I think that the two German States have added essential contributions here in Geneva, if I may be allowed to pronounce judgement on that. A united Germany, I am certain, will also henceforth make vital contributions to arms limitation and disarmament. As far as I am personally concerned, I hope, that it will be only a break in my work in the field of multilateral relations and disarmament.

It is not presumptuous to express here my expectation that the Conference on Disarmament will conclude its most important work in the course of the next year and will agree on the convention on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not only a must, it is also a want on our part. Nobody can relieve us of this task. As has become manifest during this year's disarmament session, this can only be achieved with each other and not without one another, but in no way against each other. Certainly, the prohibition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, the complete destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities is not an easy exercise. However, the time is ripe for it. The idea of convening a Foreign Ministers' meeting on this matter, which is gaining ground, raises well-founded hopes that the last stage of negotiations

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

can be started. In a time of rapid change, in which chances and risks lie closely together, as recent developments show, the speedy conclusion of a CW convention would be a decisive contribution to lasting stability.

Such a Foreign Ministers' meeting - if possible, at the beginning of the 1991 session - could provide the urgently needed political impulse for it. If this meeting is to be of benefit, I am convinced it has to deal with the final negotiating package which contains the still pending essentials of a global CW ban. The meeting should agree on both the mandate and guidelines of negotiation and be in a position to set a date for the conclusion of the negotiations. It could also confirm what has already been agreed and could come to an understanding concerning the date of the final round at Foreign-Minister level.

I know about the concerns, I also know about the prejudice and the existing scepticism. But we have to do it, if we do not want to dash the people's hope of peace and a secure future.

It is owing to the initiative of many in this room and thanks to the readiness for compromise of all that we tried this year to design the architecture of a future comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. All groups have submitted their ideas thereon. They should constitute building components for the co-operative preparation of such an important treaty. Admittedly, the distance to be travelled along this road is still long, and this is underscored by critical debates we had on this subject. Questions are posed whether the one or other issue raised is a gambit by one or other group. Some fear that the two super-Powers would disregard the others, and so on. Here lie reasons why the Conference's work in the field of a nuclear test ban has so far been limited in scope. To surmount these obstacles is, I think, the very aim of our decision jointly taken in July this year on the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

This calls for confidence and this calls for the ability to recognize and make use of new developments which are going on. I trust that this will be the case. Furthermore, I trust that thereby we will be able to terminate the arms race on Earth and to prevent it in outer space.

It was Emmanuel Kant who, 200 years ago, described the "condition politique" in the following way: "The necessity to decide reaches farther than the possibility to recognize". That this holds true, more than it did ever before, is indisputable. As a realist, I also know that we cannot build today's security on visions for tomorrow. On the other hand, as actors in this Conference, we also know full well that we must create the foundation for future security today. And for it to come true, we need visions.

My vision is that the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe will be agreed upon at the CSCE summit in Paris, that it will be followed by a second treaty on confidence- and security-building measures, that the START negotiations between the United States and the USSR will be wound up successfully and concluded at the end of this year, that 1991 will become the year when a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is concluded, that positive results in the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear explosions will sooner or later lead us to the negotiating phase on a

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

nuclear-test-ban treaty, that defensive military structures and security concepts can become a central item of this Conference - if it is right that we do not want military confrontation, but strive for the prevention of war.

Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Konatina, Ambassador Berasategui, the members of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, interpreters and all the members of the secretariat, all that remains is for me to thank you all most sincerely for your excellent co-operation, for the friendly relations and good personal contacts. My wife, who is attending the plenary today in the upper gallery, and myself would like to express our deepest gratitude and appreciation for all your kindness in making our stay in Geneva most fruitful and memorable. We will treasure forever the pleasant memories of our association with you. We wish you all every success in your work, good health and happiness. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dietze warmly for his statement, which we followed with all due attention, as well as for his kind words to the Chair and the members of the Conference, Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui and all the members of the secretariat - including, of course, the interpreters. Thank you again, Sir.

Permit me now to inform you of the status of work on the Conference's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. As you know, the informal open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs concerning agenda items 3, 7 and 8 have resulted in agreement. I should like to extend special thanks to everyone who was involved in those consultations and contributed to their success. I hope that today, at the meeting it is to hold at 3 p.m., the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will adopt its report to the plenary. The other Ad hoc Committees have already completed their work. I hope that the reports of the Ad hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and a Nuclear Test Ban will be submitted to the Conference during next Tuesday's plenary meeting. The adoption of those reports will take place at our final plenary meeting, on Friday, 24 August.

Since the Conference's substantive work is almost complete, we shall not need a schedule of meetings for next week. I will simply remind you that we shall have two plenary meetings, on Tuesday and Friday, and that before the meeting on Friday, 24 August, there will be an informal meeting, at 4.30 p.m., for the second reading of the technical sections of the report and the substantive paragraphs. The secretariat hopes to be able to distribute all the documents concerning the draft annual report at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 23 August, in all the working languages. The text in English might even be distributed a little earlier, at noon on Wednesday.

There is no other business for today and I therefore intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.575
21 August 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62607/2381B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 575th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference will continue today the consideration of the reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise a matter pertinent to the work of the Conference may do so. As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall submit for decision by the Conference today, when we have exhausted the list of speakers, the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Following that I shall invite the Conference to take note with appreciation of the report of the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which is contained in document CD/WP.395. Then the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider the draft decision in document CD/WP.396, which the secretariat has distributed today. Immediately thereafter we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to adopt the draft decision.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representative of Sweden, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons; the representatives of the Netherlands, Australia and India; the representative of Japan, who will speak in his capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban; the representative of Canada, who will speak in his capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; and the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee as contained in document CD/1033.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Before introducing to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair during the 1990 session, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective manner in which you are performing your duties as President during this month. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for the skill with which he carried out this task in July.

It is with much regret that I note that my distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Reese of Australia, will leave the Conference soon. He has made outstanding contributions to our work. I wish him every success in his future important functions.

The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1033, was adopted by the Committee on 10 August. It contains, as in earlier years, three parts: a technical part; Appendix I, the so-called "rolling text" proper; and Appendix II, which includes material for future work.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

In the technical part, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the mandate was changed this year, most notably by the deletion of the phrase "except for its final drafting". Among the positive developments this year reflected in this part of the report is also the increased participation of States not members of the CD. This bodes well for the efforts to achieve, eventually, broad adherence to the convention, once it has been concluded.

You may also note that the Technical Group on Instrumentation was re-established under the leadership of Ms. Rautio of Finland and, further, that several days were devoted to a special meeting with representatives of the chemical industry. In that connection, meetings devoted to specific topics were chaired by Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson of my delegation. I should like to express my deep gratitude to Ms. Rautio, Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson for their important contributions to our work.

May I also draw the attention of the Conference to the inter-sessional work foreseen for the period of 26 November-21 December 1990 and to the resumed session recommended to be held on 8-18 January 1991. On the basis of extensive consultations which I have undertaken with the Working Group chairmen, with the Friends of the Chair and with delegations, I should like to propose the following subjects for the inter-sessional work:

Working Group A: review of verification parts of the annexes to articles IV, V and VI; review of the Protocol on Inspection Procedures, Parts I and II;

Working Group B: annex on chemicals and related issues; article III;

Working Group C: measures to redress a situation; settlement of disputes; amendments (improvement of the text); financial aspects of the Organization.

I also propose to ask the Friends of the Chair to continue their work on article X and on jurisdiction and control, while I should conduct consultations on article XI and on the general pattern of verification. Finally, it is proposed that the Bureau prepare proposals for editing of the "rolling text", which can be dealt with during the inter-sessional work.

In the concluding paragraph of the technical part, reference is made to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year. Since the report was adopted on 10 August I have continued my consultations on this question. I am pleased to inform you that my consultations have indicated that there is consensus on the recommendation that the Conference on Disarmament appoint the Leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Sergei Batsanov, to be Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for 1991.

The Friends of the Chair have carried out difficult tasks in working on solutions to some specific problems, namely on article X, on old chemical weapons and on jurisdiction and control. I am very grateful indeed to

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Morel of France and Ambassador Reese of Australia for accepting to undertake this work. Due to their skill and dedication it has been possible to advance the work on these issues. Some of the results are reflected in the report which I am submitting today.

The Chair conducted open-ended consultations on the question of undiminished security, which soon came to focus on the question of universal adherence to the forthcoming convention. Open-ended consultations were also conducted on various aspects of the Executive Council and on article IX. Much work was done, especially on article IX, and it is the hope of the Chair that this work will not prove to have been in vain. Also, outside the Conference many countries worked on this issue through trial inspections and shared their experiences with other delegations by submitting reports on them in the form of working papers.

The Committee had three Working Groups. Working Group A, on verification issues, was chaired by Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan and earlier by Mr. Lamazière of Brazil and then temporarily by Mr. Molander of Sweden. Working Group B, on technical matters, was chaired by Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands, while Working Group C, on legal and institutional questions, was chaired by Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. Substantive and important progress has been made in all the three Working Groups. I should like to express my sincere appreciation and warm thanks to the Working Group chairmen for their untiring efforts and commitment, which have brought the convention closer to its completion within their respective issue areas.

The substantive parts of the report reflect the diligent work carried out this year and the many changes made in the "rolling text". They are well known to delegations, and I will therefore only deal with them briefly.

Among the achievements, I should like to mention especially the texts included in appendix I on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, on the order of destruction, on amendments and on the settlement of disputes. There are also many other additions and improvements in the text in other parts of the draft convention.

Among the new material in appendix II, I should like to draw your attention to the texts on jurisdiction and control, on old chemical weapons and on measures to redress a situation.

My warm thanks also go to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, to the Deputy Secretary, Ms. Marcaillou, and to their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, for their very professional work and invaluable assistance. I wish also to express my thanks to the interpreters and all the technical staff who have contributed to making our work proceed in an effective and smooth manner.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

This year, 1990, has been a year when the political issues have been brought to the forefront. New important elements have been added to the draft convention, and further substantive progress has thus been made towards its completion. At the same time I must note, like last year's Chairman, that the political breakthrough that many of us had hoped for has not occurred this year either. Instead, previously hidden political problems have been highlighted. This is a stage we must get through in order to complete our work. I can only hope that this will be possible in the near future. Time is not working in our favour. Political declarations must soon be translated into a more flexible attitude and a will to make compromises at the negotiating table.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction of the Committee's report and for his kind words to the Chair. I should like to congratulate him on the conclusion of the work of the Committee, which has been very intensive during his chairmanship. I particularly wish to emphasize here the personal merit of Ambassador Hyltenius and the three co-ordinators of the Working Groups in their joint efforts to move forward the negotiations in this organ of the Conference. I am sure that delegations will have taken note with interest of Ambassador Hyltenius' suggestions regarding the consultations in the inter-sessional period.

I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): First of all, I take pleasure, Mr. President, in offering you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the Chair.

We do not know yet when the negotiations on a convention banning all chemical weapons will be concluded. We were more optimistic about a swift conclusion at the beginning of the summer session than at the time when this year's session of the Conference is coming to an end. Nevertheless, we still expect the CW convention to be finalized next year, or in 1992 at the latest. It is, therefore, not too early to consider some consequences of the final outcome of the negotiations. In particular I would like to say a few words about the question of the future seat of the CW treaty Organization, for which The Hague has been proposed as a candidate, first during SSOD-III and again at the opening of this year's spring session of the Conference on 6 February.

After the signature of the convention, a Preparatory Commission will be established to set up the chemical weapons disarmament organization, or "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" as it is presently called in the "rolling text". For all practical purposes the Preparatory Commission should preferably have its seat in the same city as the Organization itself. In this way, the Commission could be smoothly transformed into the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council after the entry into force of the convention. Furthermore, the Commission would be closely involved with the Technical Secretariat in statu nascendi, including its inspectorate and its laboratory.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will have a unique character. To establish it in the vicinity of the IAEA would have advantages but also disadvantages. One may expect in such a case that the IAEA Board of Governors and the Executive Council of the CW Organization would, to a large extent, consist of the same persons. This could lead to continuous comparisons between established nuclear safeguards practices on the one hand, and verification measures under the CW convention on the other. But the verification measures required under the CW convention are very different: they have a wider scope and are on occasion more intrusive, albeit generally less precise than nuclear safeguards. Maybe we should also keep in mind that the CW Organization might not follow the United Nations salary system because of its need for some highly qualified experts. This would be more difficult to achieve in a "UN city", or could lead to undesirable tensions between different organizations.

At the first day of this year's spring session, the Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek, repeated his offer to make The Hague the seat of the Organization. Today, we introduce a bid-book which contains a concrete proposal highlighting the substantial financial aspects of that offer. Let me quote directly from the bid-book just circulated, page 13: "The Netherlands is prepared to bear the costs of leasing a building to house the Preparatory Commission and the treaty Organization during the preparatory phase and for a considerable period of time after the signing of the treaty, which would cover half of the transitional period. The Netherlands would also meet the costs of furnishing and equipping the accommodation. One matter requiring further attention during the preparatory phase will be the training of inspectors. The Netherlands is studying the possibility of providing training facilities free of charge".

The bid-book also outlines some further advantages of The Hague as the seat for this particular Organization. These advantages include the presence near The Hague of a renowned laboratory in the CW field, which could be used as a basis for the laboratory needed by the Technical Secretariat. For years, Dr. Ooms, whom you all know, was the Director of that Laboratory. Another asset of The Hague, certainly in view of the foreseeable occurrence of short-notice inspections, are the excellent world-wide airlinks available at Schipol International Airport, half an hour by train from the railway station which lies in the vicinity of the proposed premises for the CW treaty Organization. I may point out that several options for suitable modern office buildings in the centre of The Hague have been indicated in a bid-book.

One other important ingredient for an easy life in this internationally oriented city is the fact that English is generally spoken fluently, as well as often German and French or other languages. Furthermore, The Hague and the Netherlands as a whole offer a range of international educational institutions, foreign television stations, foreign-language theatres, etc.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

As you all know, the Netherlands, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, has, from the beginning, actively participated in the chemical weapons negotiations. Numerous contributions have been made in the form of technical and other working papers and in the form of chairmanship of working groups. CW research in the Netherlands has been geared towards the achievement of the convention. We were the first to organize a trial inspection in 1986, followed by an international workshop.

We sincerely hope that members of the Conference will take all these elements into account when deciding on the seat of the future Organization.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. We all remember the distinction and skill with which Ambassador Wagenmakers presided over the work in the opening month of this summer session.

I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Reese.

Mr. REESE (Australia): Mr. President, at this late stage in our session, this is my first opportunity to acknowledge you in the Chair. Australia is pleased to have you preside over us and we will continue our close co-operation with you when you look after the affairs of the Conference on Disarmament during the months ahead, when the Conference is not in session.

In making a farewell statement to the Conference on Disarmament I am conscious that my time here has been short. Nevertheless, I have experienced two years of intensive negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons aimed at completing the chemical weapons convention. In the second of these two years my delegation co-ordinated the Western Group in the negotiations.

The energy put into negotiations following the Paris Conference in 1989 resulted in progress being made on many parts of the convention. This should have brought us closer to the completion of the convention. Yet I leave Geneva concerned that this summer we are still some distance from the conclusion of the convention and that there is apprehension that the negotiations are faltering.

We have made valuable progress this year in areas of importance to the convention, such as the main legal aspects, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and a number of technical aspects.

At the beginning of this year, however, we were all aware that progress needed to be made on the central issue of the convention - verification. At the end of this session any assessment would have to conclude that we have failed in this objective. We have failed because of the time it has taken some delegations to put their policies forward and because the differences in approach to the issue are still too wide to bridge. Related to the

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difficulties we have experienced in developing article IX of the convention in regard to the process of challenge inspection, or inspections on request, is the reluctance among delegations to address the problem of decision-making by the Executive Council of the convention in regard to the inspection process.

Australia's approach to verification is predicated on the requirement for an effectively verifiable convention in which we can have confidence in States parties' compliance. This is a matter of critical national security for us. We are concerned about any approach to compliance which would give to the requested State a right simply to refuse an inspection team's access to a suspect site on the basis of the requested State's contention that the side was not relevant to the convention. We recognize the importance of protecting sensitive matters of national security, but believe that a combination of right of access, balanced by some management of that access, would enable the effective operation of the convention. Trial inspections of military facilities conducted by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany suggest that a satisfactory balance can be struck between the requirements of the inspection process and the security concerns of the inspected State.

I would like to touch on one other area of verification, the proposal for a system of ad hoc inspections. A number of delegations have made clear that they believe the concept should be explored further as part of the overall approach to verification. It offers the possibility of a verification system additional to routine inspections and challenge inspections which would strengthen the level of deterrence of the convention without the same degree of intrusiveness as a challenge inspection.

I do not think that ad hoc inspections can be dismissed as "Disguised challenge inspections" without first having the opportunity to discuss the concept further in the Ad hoc Committee. Yet, some delegations are unwilling to agree to this further discussion. I think it inimical to our processes for delegations to prejudge an issue. It is possible, of course, that, when the whole verification package is finally developed, Governments will not see a need for ad hoc inspections, but we cannot make that judgement now.

Verification may be thought of as a microcosm of the convention, requiring a balance of interests and a willingness to keep a sense of proportion and overall practical balance. It is essentially a political act of assurance among the States parties. Thus, efforts to reduce the elements of confrontation and to increase the sense of shared mutual obligation and support should be the centre of our efforts. The current conceptual framework is adequate in its political content and feasible in its commercial impact. It deserves to be supported, completed and adopted.

In this negotiating period the various approaches to ensuring universality of the convention have caused divisions among us. Our common goal is a convention which is universal in its application, and it is no accident that the issues we find most difficult to resolve are all directly related to this common goal. It is evident that there is no single path to

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

universality. There needs to be more flexibility on the part of delegations in this area. Where a proposal is not favoured by some delegations, there should be a greater attempt at an exchange of views to determine the best way of finding common ground.

The chemical weapons convention will offer a package of measures that will be unprecedented in the security and commercial areas. The willingness of States to accept this uniquely complex, politically sensitive and commercially intrusive treaty depends on a subtle balancing of many interests. Because of these complexities, it has taken so many years to get to the point where the convention is within sight. This situation requires all parties to the negotiations to intensify efforts to get the convention concluded.

I think we were all aware that the issues of verification and the character of the Executive Council were going to be the most difficult issues to resolve in developing the convention. We are not at that point, and that may be the reason for the current sense of faltering. But it is also a time when the international community's need for the elimination of chemical weapons could not be more apparent. Recent developments in the Persian Gulf bring home to all of us the concern that while chemical weapons exist there is the danger that they might be used. We believe that the coming decade will see either a worsening of chemical weapons proliferation, in which chemical weapons will become a common feature of many national arsenals, or the effective functioning of an international authority dedicated to the oversight of a total ban on these weapons. It is the moment for us to assess carefully the point we have reached in the negotiations and to determine the best way forward.

In Australia's view, the negotiations are now in need of clear political direction in the absence of which the negotiations may well flounder. A number of other delegations have recently expressed a similar view. Now that the structure and content of the convention is apparent, or, as another delegation has put it, now that all the main issues are on the table, it is essential for Governments to focus on bridging the remaining differences, and particularly in the critical area of verification.

While we do not think artificial deadlines are appropriate, the fact is that setting deadlines is often the only way to bring sufficient concentration and attention to detail to get matters resolved. The alternative is too easily a leisurely pace which leads to opportunities lost as one or several of the many ingredients change. In this regard, we were pleased with the more substantial and comprehensive industry input at the meetings held in June. We welcome the significant achievements in the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those agreements need now to be translated into the multilateral environments, since the problems posed by chemical weapons cannot be resolved by bilateral measures alone. We agree with the ideas proposed by some delegations for ministerial meetings in the first half of 1991, to be followed, we believe, by the presentation of the completed convention to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-sixth session.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

Of course, a ministerial meeting would need to be well prepared, and in this regard we welcome the informal consultations which Ambassador Hyltenius will undertake between now and the inter-sessionals.

The Conference cannot be allowed to squander the responsibility which we have to the international community to complete the convention as a matter of urgency. The negotiating session in 1991 must be the period for that completion.

Finally, on the subject of chemical weapons I would like to pay tribute to the two chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee during my time here. Both Ambassador Morel in 1989 and Ambassador Hyltenius this year, gave strong leadership to the Committee's work. Both of them showed great professional skills, creativity and tirelessness in their efforts to keep us moving forward. The role of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is of great importance and I am pleased that the Committee will again enjoy leadership of a high standard in the Chairman for 1991, the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Sergei Batsanov.

Of the other issues before the Conference I should like to comment on the constructive outcome of the review of the functioning of the Conference conducted by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. Bearing in mind the failure of the Group of Seven's earlier attempts to improve the functioning of the Conference, I was sceptical about the prospects for Ambassador Kamal's consultations. He deserves full credit for his skilled and productive consultations, which will lead to some practical and time-saving improvements in the operation of the Conference.

Given the extent of improvement in the international political climate, I regret that some delegations were not more responsive to proposals for a more critical look at the Conference's agenda - an agenda which was adopted in 1979 following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The lack of substantive progress on a number of those agenda items would, at the least, suggest that, more than ten years later, there was scope to set them aside and consider issues which might lend themselves to more fruitful discussion.

To contend at this stage that consideration of the decalogue from SSOD-I simply requires more "political will" scarcely seems an adequate answer. For Governments to continue to commit resources to the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons negotiations there will need to be changes made to the agenda. Others before me have suggested areas such as conventional weapons and a regional approach to disarmament as possible issues for the Conference on Disarmament to take up. As we look to improvements in the performance of the Conference on Disarmament, our approach should have in mind multilateral arms control and disarmament as a whole. We should ensure therefore that such changes are undertaken in conjunction with the equally necessary reform of the Disarmament Commission.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

This year the Conference reached agreeement on a mandate to enable the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to be reconstituted. Australia welcomes that development.

Our commitment in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere to securing an NTB is well known. We continue to regard the attainment of an NTB as a matter of urgency, because of the contribution it can make to halting vertical proliferation as well as horizontal proliferation. In the absence of agreement on a negotiating mandate for an NTB we believe that much useful work which will be necessary to put an NTB in place can be undertaken in the Ad hoc Committee. We look forward to getting on with that work.

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons began in Geneva yesterday. Along with other States parties to the NPT we will be working for a positive outcome to the Conference. We place the greatest importance on this Treaty because of the unique contribution which it makes to the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The non-proliferation achievements of this Treaty should not be put at risk to achieve other goals, including that of a nuclear test ban, important as such an objective is. We must work for both objectives. We must ensure that the NPT can continue beyond 1995 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The increased interest in the NPT, represented by additional signatories and the participation as observers at this Conference of the nuclear-weapon States France and China, is a most encouraging augury.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Secretary-General, Mr. Komatina, members of the secretariat, the interpreters and my colleagues for the personal and professional association I have enjoyed with them during my time here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

His Government has appointed the Ambassador of Australia, Mr. Reese, to other functions, and I congratulate him on that. At the same time, I cannot but express a feeling of regret, for in him the Conference is losing a colleague who has contributed a great deal to its work, both through his personal qualities and through his profound knowledge of disarmament matters. We shall all remember his friendliness and his diplomatic ability. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Reese every professional success and personal happiness.

I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, may I, at the outset, convey to you my warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. We are particularly happy to see a representative from the friendly country of Romania occupying the Chair. My delegation would like to compliment you on the effective guidance you have provided, especially in the

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preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly. I would also like to thank your predecessors, the Ambassadors of Poland and Peru, for their valuable contributions to our work, and all those who have welcomed me in their midst.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is natural to take stock of developments and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. While sustained dialogue has continued between the United States and the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis, the assessment of our work in the Conference on Disarmament this year is somewhat sombre.

Among the nuclear issues on our agenda, the Conference has managed to set up an Ad hoc Committee on item 1, "Nuclear test ban", after a gap of seven years. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. We, on our part, had accepted the compromise in the hope that this would mark the beginning of a sincere effort to embark on preparatory work towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We must, therefore, place on record our deep sense of disappointment at the fact that, even before we have agreed upon the programme of work, doubts have arisen about the continuance of the Committee. If its establishment at this session is not to be seen as an eyewash for the commitments towards nuclear disarmament in the context of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference and the PTBT amendment conference, this Ad hoc Committee must resume its work without delay at the beginning of the 1991 session. Most of the nuclear "arms control" agreements, including the INF Treaty, have left the loophole of allowing for the military use of the fissionable material which will be made available as a consequence of the destruction of the delivery vehicles. The development of the third-generation nuclear weapons can be effectively impeded only by a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which aims at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time. This goal cannot be attained as long as even one of the nuclear-weapon States remains outside these negotiations, as long as nuclear weapon tests are thought necessary for maintaining a "credible" policy of nuclear deterrence and as long as a comprehensive test ban is treated only as a long-term goal. The aim of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and consequently its scope, should be to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit, in a non-discriminatory way, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimension. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress to perpetuate the division of the world into two categories of nations. The interests of the nuclear-weapon States must be taken into account on a basis of complete equality with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In deciding upon the scope of the treaty we must bear in mind the fact that all the existing international instruments which refer to nuclear tests contain separate provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions.

In the view of my delegation, one of the primary tasks is to achieve tangible progress towards the universally agreed goals of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. In this context, it is worthwhile to recall that both the United States and the Soviet Union declared, as far back as 1985, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The concept

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of a nuclear-weapon-free world was also discussed by the leaders of the two countries at Reykjavik. Despite these commitments, it is a pity that it has not proved possible to set up ad hoc committees even to undertake preliminary work on these subjects. The mandate proposed by the Group of 21 on item 2 reflects two crucial aspects of this issue: the urgency attached to it, and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework. It aims at the negotiation of agreements with adequate provisions for verification. It does not lay down rigid time-frames and it is open-ended and flexible. The progress achieved in bilateral negotiations cannot replace genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have the most vital interest in this matter, although States which possess nuclear weapons clearly bear a special responsibility.

Similarly, on item 3 of our agenda, the Group of 21 have tabled a draft mandate which is intended to take into account the views of other delegations. On our part, we would favour negotiations on a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This proposal has enjoyed widespread support in the General Assembly over the years. Ever since a nuclear weapon was first used in Hiroshima, sentiment has grown overwhelmingly against the use of nuclear weapons. During the 1980s, beginning with the TTAPS report, a number of studies have been carried out on the climatic and global effects of nuclear war, and there is clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic and irreversible consequences for our biosphere. In spite of the 1988 bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union establishing the nuclear risk reduction centres, the possibility of a nuclear war still exists and the stakes are still the same.

On item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", once again a number of concrete proposals have been reiterated, in a repetition of the exercise in which the Ad hoc Committee on this item has been engaged in since 1985. Our future work needs to be structured and organized in a way that enables us to undertake fully-fledged negotiations that can strengthen the international legal régime pertaining to outer space. The existing régime does impose some legal restraints on the placement of certain types of weapons in outer space. However, these restraints are neither comprehensive in scope, nor do they apply to all kinds of weapon systems. New legal instruments need to be developed which would reflect the political reality as well as technological developments. Among the proposals that have been put forward, some relate to specific aspects, such as banning ASAT weapons and providing immunity to satellites, and others adopt a comprehensive approach, such as amendment of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or addition of a protocol to it. While supporting different proposals for negotiating concrete measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, my delegation has placed particular emphasis on a comprehensive agreement which would prohibit the development of anti-satellite weapons and provide for the dismantling of all existing systems. The ABM Treaty places restrictions on the testing of weapons in an ABM mode, but permits weapons to be tested in an ASAT mode. A moratorium on the testing of the existing dedicated anti-satellite weapons needs to be formalized through multilateral negotiations. Complementary proposals have also been put forward to provide immunity to satellites,

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especially those that generate opportunities for economic growth and international security. However, confidence-building measures such as "rules of the road", "keep-out zones", etc., provide only a limited immunity; full immunity can only be provided by a verifiable comprehensive ASAT ban.

Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was set up at the beginning of this year through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, and his hardworking delegation. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably, we have made some progress, but, against the background of the political will and the sense of urgency expressed in Paris last year, the progress has been disappointing.

We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to rid mankind of chemical weapons is through the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated; and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective towards which we are working. Political reality dictates that the risk does not merely come from the possible use of chemical weapons, but from their very existence, and the only way to address this reality is to find a politically viable solution.

A convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory, must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. To this end, my delegation is willing to discuss all details regarding such a verification system in any form. It is only through a sustained and frank dialogue that the different perceptions can be resolved, and not through polemics and procedural wrangles that we have witnessed recently, which only retard our progress. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in the development of the chemical industry for such purposes.

Adequate provision has already been made in the draft convention for consultations, co-operation and fact-finding; and the periodic conferences of States parties would provide an opportunity for continuous review of the working of the convention. The proposed provision for a special conference of States parties to review the implementation of the principles and objectives of the convention eight years from its entry into force, a conference in which those who possess chemical weapons would be accorded special privileges, far from achieving the desired objective of universality, would in fact have the opposite effect, as States may tend to shy away from joining a convention

(Mr. Chadha, India)

whose future is uncertain and which does not ensure their security from the very beginning. If at all, such an assessment needs to be made on the convention's entry into force by all States which subscribe to it, on an equal footing. The ideal way to ensure universality is to make the convention attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not, and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry - which plays an important role in their development - in the hope of achieving enhanced security.

On the subject of challenge inspection, India was among those who welcomed the approach adopted by Ambassador Hyltenius. We believe that, once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking a reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection, therefore, needs to be ensured.

Preliminary discussions have also been held on the subject of the composition of the Executive Council. We believe that the Council must be representative of the interests of all States parties. However, in practice it is possible that certain parties will serve on the Executive Council more frequently than others, in accordance with accepted criteria. This need not be seen to detract from the basic principles of equitable geographic balance, non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

We shall be having detailed discussions on Schedules during our inter-sessional work. In our view, specific chemicals should be included in Schedule 1, rather than whole families of chemicals or analogues. Each individual chemical should be assessed for its toxicity level and application range. If found to have no civilian application, a specific chemical could then be included in Schedule 1. Research should also be allowed on those chemicals which have more applications than just weapons use. Adopting a very narrow view on the thresholds for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals will only stifle the chemical industry. The interests of security have to be matched with the objectives of development. It is with this aim in mind that my delegation has always adopted an attitude of flexible dialogue on all aspects and forms of verification for the proposed convention.

I am sure that we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. Taking the priority of the nuclear issues into account, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time-frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

This is also the most propitious time to give some thought to the relationship between disarmament and development. In the simplest terms, disarmament and development are linked, because both the arms race and the process of development compete for scarce resources. The arms build up not only pre-empts scarce resources, but also distorts economic structures, undermines economic systems - both national and international - and vitiates

(Mr. Chadha, India)

the atmosphere for international co-operation. The Conference on Disarmament will do well to seize its opportunity for halting the arms race, and for building a new structure of international security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, for his statement and for his kind words concerning the Chair, my country and the relations between India and Romania.

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Donowaki, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been issued as document CD/1035.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. President, first of all, my delegation wishes to join with others in extending to you congratulations upon your assumption of the very important post of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. You have been guiding our work with excellent leadership and skill and, in accordance with the procedures to be adopted, we understand that the work as President will continue on into the inter-sessional period and, together with the incoming new President for next year's session, the responsibility of the presidency will continue to be very important. Our delegation pledges that we will support you in the discharge of your responsibilities. Also, I should like to say that my delegation feels very sorry to lose our colleague, Ambassador David Reese, and I should like to express my congratulations and wish him all the best in his new responsibilities.

Today, I am going to take the floor as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and I am happy to introduce to the Conference the report which is contained in document CD/1035. As we know, the Ad hoc Committee was established on 17 July, since when it has had four substantive meetings: on 20 July, 27 July, 6 August and 9 August, and two meetings in order to adopt its report. Throughout those meetings on substance, the discussion was very fruitful and lively and touched on various issues relating to the scope, structure, compliance and verification; the progress of the discussions is contained in this report. Also, at the meeting of 6 August, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the officials of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts which proved to be useful indeed to the work of the Committee. Also, at the suggestion of various delegations, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the chief negotiators in the bilateral talks on nuclear testing between the United States and Soviet Union. As Chairman, I should like to express again gratefulness for all the kindness of the delegations of the United States and Soviet Union in making those two chief negotiators available to appear at our Conference.

I will not go into the detail of the report because the contents have already been discussed to the full in the Ad hoc Committee and the text has been circulated to you by the secretariat. In general, it was the agreement of the Ad hoc Committee that, in spite of the short time it had at its disposal, the Committee carried out a preliminary examination of specific and interrelated test-ban issues. And, bearing in mind the long lapse we had for seven years before the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, it was

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

recognized by the Committee that those initial discussions we had in the Ad hoc Committee were useful in preparing for the future consideration of the issue. There was also agreement that substantive work on the agenda item should continue at the 1991 session of the Conference.

I should like to also refer to one aspect of the work of the Committee. The Committee, when it was established, decided not to agree on the programme of work for this year because of the shortness of the time it had, and the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee was taken as a de facto programme of work for this year. On the other hand, as Chairman I conducted prior consultations on the question of a programme of work for possible future reference, and such an exercise was regarded as useful in order to save time for the future Ad hoc Committee at the beginning of the session when it is to be re-established. And such prior consultation has been conducted by myself. However, as stated in paragraph 31 of the report, the work has not been completed and there have been many suggestions that during the inter-sessional period of the Conference on Disarmament the work should be continued. I realize that, unlike in the case of the very important negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, where the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is authorized to continue negotiations, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban does not function in that manner. However, because of the suggestions made, I have agreed to continue, not as Chairman, but as an individual, the consultations among the members of the Conference on the question of the programme of work during the inter-sessional period. And since I understand that, in accordance with new procedures which are going to be adopted, the outgoing President and the incoming president of the Conference are indeed in charge of those questions, I hope you will give me appropriate guidance.

Finally, I should like to express my sincere appreciation for the co-operation extended to me by the Chair and by all my colleagues around the table. I should also like to express my thanks to the secretariat, particularly Mr. Cassandra, who acted as Secretary, and to all the members of the secretariat, including the interpreters and the Conference Service.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for his introduction of the Committee's report and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I congratulate him on having concluded the work on a particularly important item of our agenda. Like many others of us, I can attest and pay tribute to the effort, patience and constructiveness that characterized the work done by Ambassador Donowaki.

I give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, to introduce, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the report of that Committee, which is contained in document CD/1034.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Before I present my report, I would like to join others in thanking Ambassador Reese of Australia for his very strong contribution to the Conference and wish him well in his new assignment.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

In my capacity as this year's Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, it gives me great pleasure to present to the Conference on Disarmament our report, which was circulated earlier as document CD/OS/CRP.7/Rev.1 of 10 August and is now before all delegations as document CD/1034 of 16 August. I understand from the secretariat that all language versions of the draft report will have been circulated within the next 24 hours, which, it is hoped, will provide enough review time to enable the draft to be adopted by plenary at our next meeting of Friday, 24 August.

Now that our work in the Ad hoc Committee for this session has come to a close, I would also like to express my sincere thanks to all those delegates and experts who contributed to our endeavours. In particular, I would like to thank the various group co-ordinators, Ambassador Arteaga and Ms. Clauwaert Gonzalez of Venezuela; Ambassador Bayart and Mr. Erendo of Mongolia, and later Ambassador Králik and Mr. Gašpar of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; Ambassador Hou and Mr. Zhang of China, and Ambassador Morel and Mr. Finaud of France. And a very special word of thanks and appreciation is due to the Ad hoc Committee's secretarial staff, Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov and Ms. Audrey Williamson, and to the interpreters. I thank them all.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada, Mr. Shannon, for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee. I would also like to express our appreciation to him for the work he did in steering the work of the Committee. I would also like to echo the expression of thanks that were made at the last meeting of the Ad hoc Committee with respect to his diplomatic skills.

I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today I would like to present joint information by the USSR and the United States of America on the sixteenth round of bilateral consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was held here in Geneva from 7 to 16 August 1990. During 1990, the USSR and the United States have been actively conducting consultations on questions relating to a chemical weapons ban that complement the multilateral negotiations on the convention. On 8 March and 24 April the Conference on Disarmament was provided with information on the fourteenth and fifteenth rounds of these consultations respectively and today, by agreement with the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Ledogar, I am presenting information on the sixteenth round.

During this round the delegations began to develop a document on inspection procedures which will contain detailed provisions about the implementation of inspection measures within the framework of the Agreement signed by the Presidents of the USSR and the United States on 1 June 1990 on

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention banning chemical weapons. It is planned to conclude the preparation of the document on inspection procedures by 31 December 1990.

An understanding was reached during this round that the document will consist of four sections dealing with general provisions on the preparation and conduct of inspections and inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities, storage facilities and production facilities. In drawing up the document on inspections, the sides have agreed to utilize to the maximum extent the already available provisions from the draft convention on a chemical weapons ban which is on the negotiating table of the Conference on Disarmament. This approach is intended not only to accelerate the preparation of the bilateral document, but also to provide valuable experience for the practical implementation of the provisions worked out at the multilateral negotiations and concerning verification of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

As is known, with a view to gaining experience and facilitating the elaboration and implementation of the future convention, the USSR and United States also agreed within the framework of the bilateral Agreement of 1 June 1990 to conduct bilateral trial challenge inspections. During the sixteenth round the delegations started to prepare detailed provisions for such trial inspections, including the number and location of facilities to be inspected and the procedures to be followed. A preliminary understanding was reached on the conduct of two trial inspections. The discussion of issues concerning trial inspections will be continued in order to reach agreement on the requisite arrangements.

During the round, special consultations continued on questions of co-operation between the USSR and the United States with respect to methods and technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. Highly qualified experts from both sides who are directly involved in the preparation and execution of national programmes for the destruction of chemical weapons in the USSR and the United States participated in these discussions. There was an exchange of information on the state of implementation of these national programmes. The experts also discussed issues concerning: the preparation of the Soviet and United States safety and remissions standards, including monitoring by instruments of compliance with them; the transport of chemical weapons for destruction; the prevention of accidents at chemical weapons destruction facilities and the handling of emergencies; and control of the process of chemical weapons destruction. Both sides were of the opinion that these were useful discussions.

In accordance with the existing agreement, on 21 and 22 August 1990 a group of United States specialists will be visiting the Soviet Union's Chapaevsk training centre for personnel of chemical weapons destruction facilities. During this visit there will be, inter alia, discussions on matters related to the technology for destroying chemical weapons based on

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

phosphoro-organic compounds. A visit by a group of Soviet experts is planned for this autumn to the destruction facility on Johnston Atoll, which in July of this year began actual operations on the destruction of United States chemical weapons.

Discussions continued during the round on matters relating to the implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum. They concerned both the exchange of data which has taken place and the visits already made to Soviet and United States facilities in the context of the Memorandum.

Particular attention was devoted during the round to questions concerning the preparation of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Both sides expressed concern over the slow pace of the negotiations. The delegations reviewed the basic questions still unresolved in order to compare the USSR and United States approaches and to determine the likelihood of the early attainment of consensus in the multilateral negotiations.

Despite being relatively short, the sixteenth round of the bilateral consultations - which, as I have already said, lasted from 7 to 16 August - proved a very rich one from the point of view of both the amount of work accomplished during the ten days and of the results achieved. The parties agreed to conduct the next round of bilateral consultations during the autumn of 1990.

That is the end of the joint information which I was presenting on behalf of the two delegations and now, if I may, I would like to say a few words on my own behalf. First of all, I would like to join those representatives who have already taken official farewell from the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, David Reese, who will shortly be leaving Geneva and undertaking important new functions in his capital. I would like to wish him all the very best and every success. His stay here in Geneva was not a long one, but I think we all felt that Ambassador Reese did very productive work here.

Lastly, in presenting his report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius informed the Conference that agreement has been reached and that I am to be appointed Chairman of this Ad hoc Committee next year. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all delegations for their support and understanding and, of course, to assure you that if I am indeed to assume this post next year, then I, personally and the Soviet delegation will endeavour to perform its duties with honour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. We have all taken note with pleasure of his statement concerning his willingness to serve as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons next session.

I have no further speakers on my list. Would any delegation like to take the floor? I see none, and so I would like to move on to other issues.

(The President)

I now submit to the Conference for decision the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in document CD/1032 concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, namely 11-22 February 1991 in Geneva. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

I now invite the Conference to take note with appreciation of the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been distributed as document CD/WP.395.

It was so decided.

May I now extend to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, our appreciation for the very efficient way in which he steered the open-ended informal consultations. The results of his efforts are embodied in the draft decision that we shall be considering today.

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting so that we may hold an informal plenary to consider the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.396. The Conference will then resume the formal plenary to continue its consideration of this draft decision. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): the 575th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference will continue its consideration of the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.396 concerning the effective and improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. As we have had an informal discusson on the subject and there have been some changes to the text, I will give the floor to Ambassador Berasategui to tell us how the draft decision, on which I hope there will be consensus, now reads.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference): As a result of the informal meeting just held, a number of changes have been introduced in document CD/WP.396. The first change concerns paragraph 5, subparagrah (c), which will now read: "that the principal debate on the establishment of subsidiary bodies and their mandates shall be held during the first two weeks of the annual session; and". The second change is to be made in subparagraph (d) of the same paragraph 5 and will consist in the deletion of the last part of the subparagraph, reading "to whom the responsibility could be handed over", and its replacement by the words: "to assist in carrying out informal consultations with a view to reaching consensus".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Ambassador Berasategui. May I take it that, with these alterations, this text, that is to say document CD/WP.396, can be adopted?

It was so decided. */

If there is no further business, I would now like to give you some information about the progress of work on the draft annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. I shall read this out fairly slowly so that delegations can take note of the technical details of what remains to be done.

With the introduction today of the reports of the Ad hoc Committees on agenda items 1, 4 and 5, the work of the subsidiary bodies has come to an end. I shall submit the three reports to the Conference for adoption at the final plenary meeting - to be held this Friday - before we take a decision on the annual report to the General Assembly. For the second reading of the technical sections and of the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8, which will take place at an informal meeting on Friday, at 4.30 p.m. before the final plenary meeting, we shall have the following documentation: on the techical sections, working paper CD/WP.388 and document CD/WP.388/Corr.1, which sets out additions and corrections made after the first reading of the technical sections; on the substantive paragraphs, working papers CD/WP.391/Rev.3, 392/Rev.1, 393/Rev.2 and 394/Rev.1. These documents, in all the official languages of the Conference, will be placed in delegations' pigeon-holes as from 5 p.m. tomorrow, so that you have time to study them before the second reading of the draft report.

As you know, the secretariat was also to prepare an index, by country and topic, of the records for the annual session of 1990. I have been informed that the draft index will be distributed on Tuesday, 4 September, and that the secretariat will receive corrections from delegations up until 14 September at noon, before the final text is included in the annexes of the annual report.

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*/ In connection with this decision, the President of the Conference made the following statement at the 576th plenary meeting: "During the open-ended consultations, firstly 'there was consensus also on the need to encourage speakers to limit their interventions to 15 minutes each' and secondly, 'all interventions welcomed as positive and constructive the procedure followed during the current session, according to which the applications of non-member States were all considered together, and not one by one. Consensus existed in the hope that this practice would continue to be followed in future sessions with the same results'."

(The President)

Allow me now to inform you how we shall proceed on Friday. The informal meeting for the second reading of the draft annual report will start at 4.30 p.m. Immediately afterwards the Conference will hold a plenary meeting to adopt the reports of the Ad hoc Committees and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. I would appreciate it if delegations wishing to take the floor at Friday's plenary meeting would register with the secretariat and say in doing so whether they wish to make their statements before or after the adoption of our annual report.

I have no further business for today. The Conference will hold an informal meeting on Friday, 24 August, at 4.30 p.m. and the last plenary meeting for 1990 will take place immediately after that informal meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.576
24 August 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 24 August 1990, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62616/4533a

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 576th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In keeping with its programme of work, the Conference will today consider and adopt the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I wish to inform you that for this plenary meeting the secretariat has placed on the tables document CD/NGC.22, concerning communications received from non-governmental organizations and persons; document CD/8/Rev.3, which contains the rules of procedure of the Conference as amended at the 575th plenary meeting; and document CD/1036, which contains the decision on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament adopted at the same meeting. I should like to make the following statement concerning that decision in my capacity as President of the Conference: during the open-ended consultations, firstly, "there was consensus also on the need to encourage speakers to limit their interventions to 15 minutes each" and secondly, "all interventions welcomed as positive and constructive the procedure followed during the current session, according to which the applications of non-member States were considered together, and not one by one. Consensus existed in the hope that this practice would continue to be followed in future sessions with the same results".

The statement that I have just made will be reflected in the record of today's plenary meeting. The secretariat will add to the record of last Tuesday's meeting a footnote that will contain the text of the statement and indicate that the statement was made today concerning the decision adopted at the 575th plenary meeting.

As I announced earlier, I shall submit the reports of the Ad hoc Committees for adoption by the Conference in the order in which they were introduced by the Chairmen.

I propose that we proceed now to the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1033. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

We now have to adopt document CD/1035 containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I have taken note of Ambassador Donowaki's willingness to make himself available to help in the process of informal consultations on the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee. I should like to assure Ambassador Donowaki that I shall remain in close contact with him and the future President of the Conference on this matter.

(The President)

I now propose that we take up for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which is contained in document CD/1034. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

That concludes the consideration of the reports of the Ad hoc Committees to the Conference.

We shall now continue the consideration and adoption of the report to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The draft report is contained in documents CD/WP/388, 388/Corr.1, 391/Rev.3, 392/Rev.1, 393/Rev.2 and 394/Rev.1. The secretariat will fill in the blanks that have been left in the text of the draft report.

I submit to the Conference for adoption the draft report to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly contained in the documents I have just mentioned. Does any delegation wish to take the floor before we adopt the report? I see none. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the annual report of the United Nations General Assembly.

It was so decided.

I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): I am making this statement on behalf of the Group of 21 on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, namely "Nuclear test ban", which we have just adopted.

The mandate of the Ad hoc Committee represented a compromise which was made possible due to the spirit of accommodation shown by all groups. On its part, the Group of 21 had agreed to the mandate despite its strong feelings in favour of a stronger negotiating mandate in a spirit of give and take and in the earnest hope that the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee would mark the beginning of sincere efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

So far the Committee has been able to hold only very preliminary discussions. Obviously, if the expectations which we have from the work of this Committee are to be fulfilled it will have to resume its work without delay at the commencement of the 1991 session of the Conference.

However, the Group of 21 notes with deep regret that, even before the Ad hoc Committee has agreed on a programme of work, doubts have been cast on its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1991 session. The Group of 21 expresses the hope that the delegations which are not yet in a position to commit themselves to the re-establishment of the Committee at the beginning of the 1991 session will reconsider their position and will join in our common endeavour towards the agreed goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, today under your able guidance we will have finally finished and adopted the final report to be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is the result of the joint efforts of all the delegations and the crystallization of the positive progress the CD has achieved in the year of 1990. At this juncture, when the work of the 1990 session of the CD is coming to a smooth conclusion, the Chinese delegation wishes to express its gratitude to you for the outstanding contribution you have made at the last stage of this session and to extend its congratulations to all the other delegations. We would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Shannon, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, Ambassador Varga, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Cambiaso, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Security Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapon States, and Ambassador Donowaki, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for the tremendous efforts they have made.

Our thanks also go to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, all staff members of the secretariat, and all the translators and interpreters, who have done a remarkable job in organizing and providing services to the entire summer session.

This year is the first year of the decade of the 1990s. It is also the first year of the third Disarmament Decade as proclaimed by the United Nations. The 1990 session of the CW was convened against the background of momentous changes in the international situation. The international community, therefore, placed high hopes on us. They expected us to make new contributions to the endeavour of putting an end to the arms race and promoting disarmament. Today, when we are taking a sober and objective stock of the work of the CD, we must be fair and point out that enormous useful work has been done and some positive results have been achieved at the CD this year. The determination of the entire international community to safeguard the completeness and thoroughness of the goal of the convention banning all chemical weapons has made it possible to usher our negotiations into an even more important stage. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after an interregnum of seven years has given people new hope for the future. Many countries have shown greater concern over such major issues as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the arms race in outer space, the promotion of disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. They have also advanced series of positive proposals and rational positions. Another encouraging phenomenon is that there are more and more non-member States participating or showing interest in the work of the CD. This year's consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD have yielded some preliminary results which constitute a good beginning for further consultations to be carried out next year from which people have reason to expect more substantive progress.

At the same time we also recognize with a sober mind that we have no reason to be satisfied with the results we have so far achieved. For these results fall far short of our expectations and the responsibilities entrusted to us. Due to reasons known to all, no substantive negotiations were carried out on a majority of the items on our agenda. It cannot be but regretted, in particular, that nuclear disarmament, which is a subject of common concern to

(Mr. Hou, China)

the entire international community, has not become the priority item on the agenda of the CD. The Chinese delegation is convinced that, if all delegations can attach adequate importance to the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and manifest due political will and determination, the CD in its next session will be able to yield substantive results on these major issues, which, in turn, are bound genuinely to improve and strengthen the role of the CD as the sole global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

Recently the evaluation of the results of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons has become a focus of much discussion. The Chinese delegation is of the view that, under the leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has done a great amount of work and achieved some noticeable progress in the past year. For this we must give due credit and must not negate everything. The existence of some differences and disputes is nothing but normal. Truth fears no debate, which only marks a further deepening of the negotiations, if we face the differences squarely and try to overcome them. At the same time, we are fully aware of the new opportunities, as well as the grave challenges, the CD is faced with on its way to an early conclusion of a CW convention.

It is the view of the Chinese delegation that the practices at the CD have provided us with some useful experiences and ways to improve our work. First of all, we must bear in mind and persist with the ultimate aim of our negotiations, namely, a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It is the only commonly shared basis for the negotiations on the convention, a basis which we laid down a long time ago. It is also the linchpin on which hinges the success or failure of our negotiations. Facts have shown that when we persist with this aim and maintain this basis, we will be able to move the negotiations forward and make new progress; if this aim is forgotten or tampered with, the nature of the convention will be changed and the basis of our negotiations shaken. That is bound to lead our negotiations astray. Undoubtedly, we must try our best to prevent this from happening. There is a Chinese saying which goes, "It is better to take one concrete step than make seven dozen hollow declarations".

The Chinese delegation also considers it important to grasp all the important issues in our negotiations and make reasonable overall arrangements so that they can be discussed in parallel with each other and in a balanced manner. Over the years we have spent a lot of time and energy on consultations concerning article IX. That is entirely necessary, but at the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that this issue cannot be dealt with separately and in isolation. Verification is not the only, much less the most important issue. The issue of the utmost importance is to guarantee that the prescribed nature and objective of the convention will not be changed, whereas verification is but a means, albeit an important one, to realize that objective. We must see not only the trees but also the forest, and must not overlook some very important issues. Facts have demonstrated that, while emphasizing the issue of verification, it is also necessary to accord due importance to such issues as the complete prohibition of the use and the thorough and unconditional destruction of chemical weapons; assistance; undiminished security, and old chemical weapons, giving them priority, or at least discussing in parallel. Otherwise we may commit the mistake of evading

(Mr. Hou, China)

important matters to dwell on trivia or, as the Chinese saying goes, "dropping a melon to pick up a sesame seed". Certainly, we should prevent such things from happening.

Finally, the principle of equality, fairness and mutual respect should be abided by in our co-operation and negotiations. Consisting of a great number of United Nations member States, the CD and its subsidiary bodies should follow the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in their work. Rule 3 of the rules of procedure of the CD stipulates explicitly that "All member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations". Represented here are both developed and developing countries; both European countries and countries from other continents; both countries belonging to the two military blocs and non-aligned countries and countries not belonging to any group. In a word, we have here countries coming from all points of the compass: north and south, east and west, which, due to their different historical and cultural backgrounds and different social systems and ideologies, are bound to have different views and opinions on certain issues. This is nothing but normal. The crux of the question is to co-operate widely on a basis of the principle of independence, mutual respect and sovereign equality, to respect and adopt a correct approach to views and opinions that are different from one's own and to preclude the introduction of political and ideological differences into the work of the CD. In this spirit we can improve our work and keep up with the trend of democratization prevailing in international relations. The Chinese delegation will, as always, co-operate with all other delegations and make concerted efforts to work for the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

Looking back upon the past and the serious problems we have faced, it is sometimes unavoidable for us to have some complaints and experience a sense of disappointment. However, when we look into the future and remind ourselves of the important mission and responsibilities entrusted to us, we have every reason to be confident. As pointed out by a famous American, "We must accept finite disappointment, but we must never lose infinite hope". We also appreciate the remark of England's Samuel Johnson: "Where there is no hope, there can be no endeavour". We also share the optimism of Maupassant as expressed in his famous dictum, "Man lives in hope". With high hopes let us brace ourselves to meet the new opportunities and challenges lying ahead.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of China, Ambassador Hou, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and secretariat of the Conference.

Would any other delegation like to take the floor? I see none. May I now then as President of the Conference make my closing statement.

Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The final plenary meetings have been rich in general surveys from a number of distinguished representatives. That makes my task easier.

(The President)

This year has been marked by unprecedented, fundamental developments in international life, by important rethinking of political, strategic and military concepts and doctrines. As for the Conference on Disarmament, the signs of increased interest on the part of the international community have grown in number. Suffice it to recall the substantial number of representatives of Governments who have come to address us or have sent messages to the Conference.

In this context, during six months of intensive work certain steps and developments have been made in the Conference. As to the specific, immediate results that have been achieved, it must be recognized, as many people have already pointed out, that the session has been frustrating in some ways, whether as regards the negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, or with respect to all the nuclear disarmament issues, the prevention of an arms race in outer space or other important items on the Conference's agenda.

I would like to confine myself to a few points concerning possibilities and constructive, forwarding-looking approaches. With respect to the negotiations on a convention for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, following a focusing of effort which warranted more significant results, it remains for us to hope that, since we now have a better knowledge of the key issues remaining to be resolved and the interests and positions that have to be taken into account, we shall be able, with the necessary political will, to make substantial progress in the near future. With respect to nuclear issues, maximum advantage must be taken of the steps made towards the elaboration of a more structured framework for a substantive debate - I am referring, of course, to the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the special informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. In this context, we should note in particular the idea repeatedly expressed here recently that care and action should be taken to maintain and in as far as possible consolidate the consensus on the establishment and operation of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the Conference's agenda. Generally speaking, providing a framework for consideration and, as appropriate, negotiation on all the questions on the agenda of the Conference must be a priority concern in the future too.

It is no coincidence that we managed to make specific progress at this session as to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. The practical steps contained in the decision to adapt the rules of procedure to the current needs of the work of the Conference are particularly significant here. To continue and expand the concerns with a view to ensuring better functioning of the Conference in all respects remains a valid objective for the future.

Directing the work of the Conference during this final month of the 1990 session has required in particular the support and contribution of all. I am grateful to you for your invaluable co-operation. I have endeavoured to maintain the spirit of co-operation and the serenity of my eminent predecessors, to ensure the smooth progress of our work and to be fully at the disposal of the Conference.

(The President)

My comments would not be complete without my paying tribute to the exceptional contribution made to our work by the secretariat, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and all their associates, including the translators and the interpreters. I would like to extend to them on behalf of us all, for the month of August and the entire session, our sincerest thanks.

Lastly, I would like to express the hope that this year's work, our conclusions in the report to the General Assembly of the United Nations and the experience that has been acquired will provide a basis for new dynamism and outstanding results in our future work, giving to it an increased stamp of negotiation in conjunction with genuine political will, full commitment and commensurate with our times, and the requirements of international life.

There are no further items to be considered prior to the closure of this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. I should just like to remind you first that, pursuant to the decision taken by the Conference at its 575th meeting, the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 22 January 1991, at 10 a.m.

As the Conference agreed when adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/1033, the Ad hoc Committee will, in accordance with paragraph 14 (c) of that document, hold a session of limited duration during the period 8-18 January 1991. I should also like to announce that open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will take place between 26 November and 21 December 1990. The first of those meetings will be held at 3 p.m. on 26 November 1990, in room V.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.